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The horseless carriage was a most remarkable creation in its day. This
bouncing, belching tribute to man's ingenuity was viewed with reverent awe
by some, with resolute contempt by others. The evolution of this machine into
the modem and magnificent automobile that emerges from today's assembly
line is an inspiring story of progress. Equally impressive, unfortunately, is the
record of deaths and injuries that have resulted from the operation of the auto-
mobile. Just as the number of automobiles and drivers has increased -steadily
with each passing year, so have the casualties mounted. Ironically, the cherished
holiday weekends are the periods of greatest traffic mortality. The tragic loss
of lives and the crippling injuries, with the accompanying grief, sorrow, pain
and disability are the obvious and immediate product of the great highway
slaughter. One step removed is the often tremendous financial loss incurred
by the victims or their surviving dependents. Such loss is alleviated, of course,
for those who are "fortunate" enough to be struck down by tortfeasors who
prvve to be financially responsible for their actions. All too often, though, the
damage is dons by those drivers who prefer to "chance it" - to gamble that
they will never cause an accident and, therefore, will never be called upon to
respond financially. The chance taken is primarily with the future welfare of
the potential victims rather than with their own welfare.
It became quite apparent long ago that some form of legal compulsion
was necessary to afford an adequate measure of protection to automobile accident
victims. The Connecticut legislature was the first to manifest this awareness
by enacting a "Financial and Safety Responsibility Law."1 This act, effective
January 1, 1926, called for the reporting of any motor vehicle accident which
involved either personal injuries or property damage amounting to $100 or
more. Upon an administrative finding of fault, the registration and driving
privileges of the owner and driver could be suspended until the offenders
established proof of future financial responsibility. This proof could consist of
a liability insurance policy in the amount of $10,000 for death or personal
injury, and $1,000 for property damage.2 Eleven years later, New Hampshire
became the first state to provide for the commencement of financial responsibility
procedures upon the mere happening of an accident without regard to fault.'
All fifty states have now adopted some form of legislation addressed to
* Member of Illinois Bar; B.S., University of Illinois, 1960; LL.B., University of Illinois,
1962; associate, Blackwell, Walker & Gray, Miami, Florida; Mr. Notman is the author -of
several articles. Until recently, Mr.'Notman was an associate with Ryan and Heller, Mattoon,
Ill.
1 Law of January 1, 1926, ch. 183, [1925] Conn. Public Acts 3958 (repealed 1927).
2 See Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection Presently
Available and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUFFALO L. Rav. 283 (1960).
3 Law of July 14, 1937, ch. 160, [1937] N.H. Laws 293, as amended, Law of April 10,
1941, ch. 63, [1941] N.H. Laws 74 (repealed 1949).
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the subject of financial responsibility of motorists.4 This is highly commendable.
Unfortunately, nearly all such legislation is lacking in one very significant respect
reminiscent of the old common-law rule applied to the canine species of
tortfeasor: one "free bite" is allowed. The procedure looks to the second acci-
dent, not the first, and requires proof of only future financial responsibility.
However, not all legislatures have "gone to the dogs." Massachusetts
adopted the first compulsory insurance program as of January 1, 1927.' Under
this approach, a prerequisite to registration is a liability insurance policy of
$5,000 per person, $10,000 per accident. Property damage is not included.
Apparently this scheme left something to be desired, because thirty years elapsed
before New -York, on February 1, 1957, became the second state to try com-
pulsory insurance. The limits were $10,000 and $20,000, respectively, as well
as $5,000 in property damage coverage.' The dynamic duo became a triad
a year later when North Carolina followed suit.7
Among the weaknesses of either of the above plans are loopholes pertaining
to nonresident drivers, hit-and-run occurrences, and company disclaimers for
want of co-operation or lack of permission to drive.
Another approach to the problem which also has met with limited success
is the indemnity fund plan adopted in Maryland,' New Jersey9 and North
Dakota." This plan calls for payment of loss out of a general fund established
for that purpose through assessments, with specific qualification procedures
spelled out for the claimant."
At long last, in December of 1956 the insurance industry took matters into
its own hands by promulgating an endorsement to be attached to the family
automobile policy. Under this endorsement, the insured can recover damages
from his own insurer upon showing that he was legally entitled to such damages
from an uninsured motorist. The endorsement covers death, personal injury,
sickness and disease with maximum limits corresponding to state financial re-
sponsibility law requirements.
This approach found favor quickly among various groups, including legis-
lators. In 1957, New Hampshire enacted legislation requiring that this endorse-
ment be included in all policies issued or delivered in the state upon vehicles
principally garaged therein.12 Virginia followed in 1958,"
s California in 1959,14
Illinois in 1963." Today a substantial number of states have such legislation.
4 The most recent state to enact such legislation is Alaska. ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.20.010 -
.640 (Supp. 1962). For a complete list of statutory citations by states, see Ward, New York's
Motor. Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past, Present and Future, 8 BUFFALO L.
REv. 215, 218 n.8 (1959).
. 5 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34 A-J (1957), as amended, '(Supp. 1966), ch. 175, §§
113 A-:G (1959), as amended, (Supp. 1966).
. 6 Law of April 16, 1956, ch. 655, [1956] McKinney's Session Laws of New York 758
(repealed 1959).
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (1965).
8 MD. ANN. CODE art. 66V, §§ 150-79 (1967).
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 6-61 to -91 (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1966).
10 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-17-01 to -10 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1967).
11 For a scholarly analysis of these plans, consult Ward, supra note 2.
12 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 268.15 (1966).
13 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1966).
14 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (Supp. 1966).
15 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (Smith-Hurd 1965).
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In some of these states the coverage is absolutely mandatory; in others -it must
be offered but may be rejected by the insured. Rejections are very rare, however,
since the cost of this endorsement is truly nominal - slightly more than- a penny
a day.' New York now has in effect what has been described as a combined
plan, utilizing the uninsured motorist coverage in conjunction with a central
indemnity fund, both of which are operated by an entity known as the Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation.'
Although one writer has characterized the use of the uninsured 'motorist
endorsement as "a snare and a delusion,"'" it has gained wide acceptance and
appears here to stay. More and more cases arising under such coverage are
turning up in the advance sheets of various reporters, and these decisions are
casting some light upon the rather shadowy picture prevalent during its infancy.
The purpose of this article is to examine, in some detail, the provisions of typical
uninsured motorist endorsements in the light of court decisions that have' in-
terpreted them during these first ten years.
II. The Basic Agreement; Definitions
Under the endorsement, the insurer agrees
to pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an un-
insured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including
death resulting therefrom .. . sustained by the insured, caused by accident
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured
automobile .... 9
It should be observed that the language requires the loss to have been caused
by "accident." This would seem to exclude any injury sustained as a direct
result of a collision that was brought about deliberately. Such was the decision
in the New York case of McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation,"0 in which another motorist intentionally drove his car into the
plaintiff's vehicle. The offending driver had a standard automobile liability
policy, but his carrier denied coverage on the ground that this was not an
16 For example, the premium charged by State Farm Mutual is $2.20 per six months or
$4.40 annually. This averages out to 1.2 cents per day.
17 N.Y. INS. CODE § 600-626, as amended, (Supp. 1967). A detailed analysis of the New
York plan appears in Ward, supra note 2, at 289. See also Gerwin, An Analysis of the Opera-
tion of the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 11 N.Y.L.F. 623 (1965);
Ward, supra note 8.
18 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4331, at 209 (1962). By characterizing
this newest approach as a "snare and a delusion" Appleman is apparently referring to the pol-
icy provisions which limit the method of recovery to arbitration. That is, the litigant is, by
means of a contract provision, denied access to the courts in establishing his claim against, the
carrier. Id. at § 4331.
19 The language quoted here, and in subsequent sections of this article, is from the 1963
Standard Family Automobile Liability Policy, as revised, January 1, 1963. The full text of this
policy is contained in 4 lsjoan & AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES 181
(1964).
It is to be noted that coverage does not ordinarily include property damage. In at least
two states, however, South Carolina and Virginia, statutes require that the coverage include
property damage. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.14 (1962); VA. CODE ANN.. § 38.1-381 (Supp.
1966).
20 16 App. Div. 2d 35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1962).
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"accident." The plaintiff then turned to her own uninsured motorist coverage,
but the court closed that door as well. This was viewed as an assault and thus
beyond the contemplated scope of the contract.
A. Who Is an "Insured"?
In the standard policy, the "insured" is defined as "the named insured and
any relative" and "any other person while occupying an insured automobile."
Some of the companies expressly include the spouse of the named insured, and
relatives of both, but only "while residents of his household."'" Applying a
rather liberal construction to this household residency requirement, a New York
court held that such coverage extended to a named insured's stepson, injured
as a passenger in a car while on military duty in Hawaii.2"
It is apparent from the definition that two classes of insureds are established.
Members of the first class, i.e., "the named insured and any relative," receive
preferential consideration since they are covered as pedestrians or while occupying
any automobile; thus, a person need only carry this endorsement on a policy
insuring one of several vehicles he may own. On the other hand, all others
receive coverage only while they are occupying the "insured automobile."
The concept of "occupying" an automobile can be a rather intriguing
subject. This term is defined in the standard policy, relative to all coverages, as
meaning "in or upon or entering into or alighting from." Most of the reported
cases that have dealt with this subject have arisen under the "medical payments"
clause rather than the uninsured motorist endorsement. These opinions are
equally applicable to the latter, though, and a brief survey of them is therefore
appropriate.
Among the plaintiffs who failed to qualify within this definition are: one
whose arm was crushed by a wheel drum when the car slipped off the jack as
he was changing a rear tire ;23 one who was riding on the running board;24 and
one who, with his passenger, was rudely interrupted by the front bumper of
another car as he stood answering nature's call at the rear of his stopped
vehicle."5
More fortunate were the following plaintiffs: one who was struck by another
automobile as he was in a. bent knee or "haunches" position with hands on his
left rear wheel; 6 one who was leaning over the front of his parked car tying on
the front bumper; 2 four who were riding on running boards of cars;2" and two
21 See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Automobile Policy 9536.6 (Illinois) issued in 1966.
22 Appleton v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 361, 228 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1962).
The rationale behind the decision was that, since mere physical presence is not enough to
create residency, a temporary physical absence does not destroy residency.
23 Green v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 W. Va. 475, 80 S.E.2d 424 (1954).
24 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Rust, 164 Tenn. 22, 46 S.W.2d 70 (1932). However, in a
later Tennessee case this decision was distinguished, and coverage was granted to a truck
driver who leaped onto the running board to apply the brakes on a rolling truck. Inter Ocean
Ins. Co. v. Norris, 205 Tenn. 217, 326 S.W.2d 437 (1959).
25 Ross v. Protective Indem. Co., 135 Conn. 150, 62 A.2d 340 (1948).
26 Christoffer v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 979, 267 P.2d 887 (1954).
27 Lokos v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 197 Misc. 40, 93 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Mun. Ct. 1949),
aff'd without opinion, 197 Misc. 43, 96 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
28" Independence Ins. Co. v. Jeffries, 294 Ky. 680, 172 S.W.2d 566 "(1943); Stewart v.
North American Acc. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.2d 1005 (Mo. App. 1931); Reynolds v. Life & Cas. Ins.
Co., 166 S.C. 214, 164 S.E. 602 (1932); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 159
Wash. 683, 294 Pac. 585 (1930).
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who were struck by their own automobiles after the cars had been hit by on-
coming vehicles. 9 An additional pair of successful plaintiffs underwent similar
experiences. In Sherman v. New York Casualty Company,"° the plaintiff
parked his car in a shed-like structure. After he got out of the car, he noticed
that his pride and joy was rolling backward toward a stone wall located some
twenty-five feet distant. He quickly placed his hands upon the rear of the car,
but was forced backward with it. However, he very deftly managed to hold
onto the license plate with his left hand and a taillight with his right hand,
while putting his knee on the rear bumper. In this unique position, he shrewdly
rode out the balance of the trip and crashed into the wall, fracturing both his legs.
Mr. Sherman's counterpart in nearby Pennsylvania actually upstaged him
a bit. The facts in Young v. State Automobile Insurance Association"' could
well have provided the premise for an Alfred Hitchcock presentation. The central
characters, Mr. and Mrs. Young, arrived home together in the family car. He
alighted from the vehicle and walked in front of it to open the doors of the garage.
Surely acting out of sheer inadvertence, as opposed to sudden irresistible impulse,
the better half then put the car into forward motion. Ever alert, Mr. Young
discerned his plight and reacted admirably. He leaped onto the front end of the
car and dung there as the unit crashed through the rear wall of the garage,
across two adjacent residential lots and finally came to rest. In entering judgment
for the insured (and injured) Mr. Young, the court remarked that there are'
many positions not normally taken while using an automobile that, nevertheless,
place the individual "in" or "upon" such automobile.
B. What Is an "Insured Automobile"?
In the standard policy, an "insured automobile" is defined as;.ci(Ja) the
automobile described in the policy, (b) a temporary substitute therefor, or (c)
an automobile operated, but not owned, by the named insured. Also included
within this term is a trailer being used with an automobile described in .(a), (U),
or (c) above, but specifically excluded is any automobile or trailer owned by a
resident of the same household as the named insured, any automobile being-used
as a public or livery conveyance, or any automobile being used without .the
owner's permission.
C. What Is an "Uninsured Automobile"?
The term "uninsured automobile" is defined in the Standard Family Auto-
mobile Policy as:
(a) an automobile or trailer with respect to the ownership, maintenance
or use of which there is, in at least the amount specified by the financial
responsibility law of the state in which the insured automobile is principally
garaged, no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable
at the time of the accident with respect to any person or organization
legally responsible for the use of such automobile, or with respect to which
29 Wolf v. American Cas. Co., 2 I1. App. 2d 124, 118 N.E.2d 777 (1954); Katz v. Ocean
Acc. & Guar. Corp., 202 Misc. 745, 112 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Mun. Ct. 1952).
30 78 R.I. 393, 82 A.2d 839 (1951).
31 72 Pa. D. & C. 394 (Lycorning County Ct. 1949).
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there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the
time of the accident, but the company writing the same denies coverage
thereunder, or (b) a hit-and-run automobile.
Although this definition is broken down into two parts, it would seem that
there are clearly three separate situations contemplated: (1) where there is
no such bond or policy; (2) where there is a bond or policy but coverage is
denied; and (3) where a hit-and-run automobile is involved. The "denial of
coverage" provision was not expressly included in this definition until 1963.
Accordingly, in a 1958 case that involved a denial of coverage due to breach
of the co-operation clause, a New York court ruled that the claimant's uninsured
motorist clause was inapplicable."2The question has frequently arisen as to whether an insurer in effect "denies
coverage" when it becomes insolvent subsequent to the accident. State courts
are divided on this issue. An affirmative answer has been given in California, "
South Carblina 4 and Virginia."5 In addition, there are now statutes in effect in
Florida, Illinois, South Carolina and Louisiana that expressly include insolvency
situ'ations within the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle." 6 On the other
-hand, a negative reply to this question has been given by the courts in Michigan,"
Missouri, 8 New York"9 and North Carolina.4"
To qualify within the meaning of "hit-and-run," the third possibility as
an "uninsured automobile," the standard endorsement requires that no fewer
than five elements be proved: (1) physical contact between such automobile
and the insured or the automobile occupied by him; (2) the identities of both
the owner and the operator of such automobile are unascertainable; (3) the
insured or someone on his behalf reported the accident within 24 hours to a
police; peace or judicial officer or the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles; (4) the
insured or someone on his behalf filed with the company, within 30 days after
the accident, a statement under oath that the insured or his legal representative
has a cause of action arising out of such accident against a person or persons
whose identity is unascertainable, setting forth the facts in support thereof; and
(5) the insured or his legal representative made available for inspection, at the
company's request, the automobile that the insured was occupying at the time
of the accident.
The statutory requirement of physical contact4 was literally construed in
the earlier cases, and some of the results were rather harsh and unrealistic. Very
little imagination is necessary to conceive of situations in which grievous injuries
.32 Berman v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 11 Misc. 2d 291, 171 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
33 Katz v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (Cal. App. 1966).
34 North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964).
35 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
36, See, e.g., ILL. ANNr. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a '(Smith-Hurd 1965), as amended, July 1,1967.." 37 Topolewski v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 6 Mich. App. 286, 148 N.W.2d 906
(1967).
38 Swaringin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. App. 1966).
3.9 Uline v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 1002, 213 N.Y.S.2d
871 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
40 Hardin v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 67, 134 S.E.2d 142 (1964).
41 N.Y. INS. CODE § 617 (1966).
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can be incurred without actual contact with the "mystery" vehicle. One slightly
exaggerated hypothetical situation vividly illustrates the point: a pedestrian
observes an automobile out of control and coming up over the curb directly
toward him; demonstrating commendable poise and athletic prowess, the pedes-
trian executes a graceful half-gainer through Macy's display window and thereby
avoids contact with the errant automobile. As his "reward" for this impressive
maneuver, he incurs the unkindest cuts of all- perhaps the most painful of
which is the denial of benefits under his uninsured motorist endorsement.
An equally heartrending experience actually occurred in Petition of Port-
man, 2 a New York case decided in 1961. A blind woman was knocked to the
ground by an insured automobile and then struck again by the same car when
it was rammed by a hit-and-run car. Recovery for the injuries sustained as a
result of the second impact was denied because there was never any direct
physical contact between her and the hit-and-run car. Oddly, an opposite result
presumably would have been reached had the first impact thrown her upon
the hood of the insured automobile, in line with the earlier discussed judicial
construction placed upon the concept of "occupying." She would then have
been an "occupant" of the insured automobile and, thus, an "insured" under
that driver's policy at the time of the second impact. This harsh result was
expressly disapproved in a subsequent case decided by the New York Court of
Appeals in 1966."' Recovery was allowed there when the plaintiffs' vehicle was
struck head on by a car that crossed the center line of an expressway after being
rear-ended by a hit-and-run automobile. Such a result is certainly more in line
with the general purpose intended by legislation requiring uninsured motorist
protection. Other cases indicate that this liberal view will eventually prevail,
at least insofar as such chain reaction occurrences are concerned.,"
Similarly, there seems to be a considerable amount of leeway permitted
in connection with the requirement of nonascertainment of the offending owner's
or operator's identity. For example, in a Virginia case45 the facts showed that
the plaintiff insured could have determined such identity, but had failed to do
so simply because, at the time of the accident, he believed he was not injured.
Four months later he discovered that he had suffered a ruptured disc as a result
of the mishap, The court ruled that his earlier omission was not a bar to recovery,
and stated: "For us to say that an insured had the duty to exercise due diligence
to ascertain the identity of an unknown motorist would be reading into the
statute language which does not there appear."
4 6
The same result was reached by a New York court in a case involving a
very slight rear-end collision." Both drivers inspected the vehicles, observed nd
damage, and reported no injuries. Consequently, they both left the scene witl-
42 33 Misc. 2d 385, 225 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
43 Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Eisenberg, 18 N.Y.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d
524, 271 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1966).
44 See, e.g., Inter-Insurance Exch. of Auto. Club v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 834 (1966); Costa v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 651, 39
Cal. Rptr. 774 (1964); Basore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S.W,2d 626 (Mo. App. 1963).
45 Mangus v. Doe, 203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962).
46 Id. at 520, 125 S.E.2d at 168.
47 Riemenschneider v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 262 N.Y.S.2d 950
(Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 309, 274 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1966).
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out exchanging identification. On the following day, the plaintiff entered a
hospital with headaches and other pain. It was held that there was indeed a
"hit-and-run" vehicle even though it did not run away.
A slight variation from the two cases just mentioned is Darby v. Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation," a 1967 New York decision.
In this case, the offending driver struck a nine-year-old boy and remained to
take the boy and his mother to a hospital. Unfortunately, he gave the mother
an incorrect name and address. Because the man could not later be correctly
identified, he was declared unascertainable, and a hit-and-run situation was held
to exist
Thus, it seems that court interpretation of the meaning of the policy term
"hit-and-run" has resulted in a qualification of both the "hit" and the "run."
There is-no longer a requirement that the plaintiff or his car actually be hit
by-the mystery car itself, and there is no absolute requirement that such car must
have run away from the scene.
This spirit of liberality was absent, however, when a New York court con-
sidered the necessity for strict compliance with the aforementioned requirement
that authorities be notified within 24 hours of the accident. The injured party
had waited three days before contacting the police. This period was held to
be roughly two days too long, and the claimant was denied recovery by the
court.49 It should be pointed out, though, that the time limitations and other
details are actually spelled out by statute in New York."0 In many states, these
details are not spelled out legislatively and come into play exclusively by appli-
cation of the policy clause itself. It would seem that the insurance carriers would
favor a statutory recitation of their policy language, since this could serve to
avoid the construction rule of contracts that calls for any ambiguities in insurance
contracts to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer who
drew the contract. With a statute, ambiguities become a matter of statutory
construction.5
Assuming that one is involved in an ordinary accident (not hit-and-run)
with another vehicle believed to be uninsured, how does one go about proving
that fact to the satisfaction of a court? This much is clear- the plaintiff has
the burden of establishing this fact, usually in a declaratory judgment action. 2
Confusion reigns, however, on the matter of what constitutes adequate proof
of the uninsured status. One writer has summed up the situation with the
statement that "this subject is as hazy as the mist of a very dense forest."5 3 An
48 52:Misc. 2d 1045, 277 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
49 Bonavisa v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 21 Misc. 2d 963, 198
N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
50 N.Y. INS. CODE § 608(b) (1966).
51 The Virginia Statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1966), is another that pur-
ports to set out in detail the specific terms and obligations of the required policy. The fourth
element of "hit-and-run" mentioned earlier - the filing of a statement with the company
within 30 days - is not among the statutory requirements. The result of this omission is that
a 30-day notice requirement in a policy has been struck down as invalid in that state. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sours, 205 Va. 602, 139 S.E.2d 51 (1964).
52 Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961);
Application of Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 214 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
53 Kovin, Uninsured Motorist Arbitration Under the Illinois Statute, 21 AaB. J. 229, 236
(1966).
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illustration in support of his conclusion is Levy v. American Automobile Insur-
ance Company,"' an Illinois decision handed down in 1961. The proof offered
by the plaintiff's attorney consisted of his own testimony that he had sent letters
to both the driver and the owner of the offending vehicle, requesting that they
inform their insurance company of the accident; that failing to receive any
response, he made a personal investigation of the matter during which both
individuals orally advised him that they were not insured. Their remarks were
admitted, over objection, as declarations against financial interest -an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. This was held on appeal to be reversible error, since
no showing had been made that these two declarants were unavailable to testify
personally, as required in order to qualify under Illinois law as an exception to
the hearsay rule. The appellate court was equally unimpressed with counsel's
argument that there had been "assent by silence," that is, that the fact was
proved by the absence of any contact by any insurer for the third parties."5
The case was remanded for retrial without any judicial indication as to
whether the "declarations against interest" would have sufficed had the two
declarants been shown to be unavailable. On retrial, however, counsel did not
rely upon the declarations. He introduced certified letters from the Illinois
Secretary of State that showed that the operator's licenses of the alleged unin-
sureds had been suspended for failure to comply with the Financial Responsibility
Law. Although the outcome of the retrial is unknown to this writer, it is believed
that this type of proof is of high and convincing quality and should suffice."5
III. Exclusions
The standard policy contains an exclusions section that provides that the
uninsured motorist coverage shall not apply:
(a) to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile (other
than an insured automobile) owned by the named insured or a relative,
or through being struck by such an automobile; (b) to bodily injury to
an insured with respect to which such insured . . . shall, without written
consent of the company, make any settlement with any person or organi-
zation who may be legally liable therefor; (c) so as to inure directly or
indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's compensation or disability benefits
carrier...
A motorcycle has been judicially determined not to be an "insured auto-
mobile" within the meaning of that term in the exclusions section. In Wester-
hauser v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company,57 the plaintiff's husband was
killed when struck by an uninsured automobile while he was riding his two-
54 31 Ill. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961). The facts which follow are set forth
in Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-A Survey, 1962 WAsH. U.L.Q. 134 (1962). Ap-
parently the author acquired such knowledge through direct communication with plaintiff's
counsel.
55 31 111. App. 2d 157, 166; 175 N.E.2d 607, 611 (1961).
56 The suggestion has been made that the insurers should be required to indicate in the
policy just what proof of noninsurance would satisfy the policy requirements. Note, Unin-
sured Motorist Coverage-A Survey, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 134, 138 (1962).
57 140 N.W.2d 719 (Iowa 1966).
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wheeled motorcycle. The carrier resisted the claim under this endorsement on
the ground that the decedent was occupying an "automobile" (other than the
insured auto) owned by the named insured or a relative and that therefore the
exclusion was applicable. The court said that although a motorcycle is probably
a motor vehicle, it certainly is not an automobile, and the exclusion does not
apply
5 8
There are at least two obvious purposes for the settlement provision: the
first is to protect the company's subrogation ights under the trust agreement
of the endorsement, and the second is to prevent the insured from making a
nominal settlement (or covenant) with a joint tortfeasor and then claiming
substantial damages from his own carrier." In prior years this prohibition
extended not only to settling but also to prosecuting to judgment an action
against the alleged tortfeasor without the written consent of the company.
Indeed, this is the way many policies are still worded. However, the Standard
Policy was revised in January of 1963, at which time the "prosecuting to judg-
ment" prohibition was moved out of the exclusions section of the endorsement.
The matter is now treated in a different manner and appears earlier in the
endorsement, immediately following the statement of the basic agreement. Such
a prosecution is no longer treated as an event that will defeat coverage. Rather,
it is now provided that no such judgment shall be conclusive of the issues of
liability or damages as between the insured and the company. These two issues
are thus reserved for future arbitration as provided elsewhere in the endorsement.
It has been held that the provision requiring the insurer's consent for
prosecution of an action against the uninsured motorist is inapplicable if the
insurer has conducted its own investigation and denies all liability on the ground
that the insured, and not the uninsured driver, was at fault in the accident. '
Moreover, this power to withhold consent is not absolute, but must be exercised
with reason and discretion. Its abuse may bring about some rather disastrous
results from the carrier's standpoint.
A striking illustration of this occurred in a recent Illinois case, Andeen v.
Country Mutual Insurance Company.6 The insured filed suit against the un-
insured motorist and forwarded copies of the process to his insurance company.
No acknowledgment or reply was forthcoming from the company, nor did the
company make any appearance in the suit. Subsequently, the plaintiff forwarded
notice of the hearing or trial date and requested written consent to prosecute
the action to judgment. Once again, the carrier failed to respond. The trial
culminated in judgments totalling $76,251.75. The insured then brought suit
to collect $60,000 of this sum (the policy limit) from the carrier under the
58 Interestingly, it is to be noted that a policy issued by a major insurance company in
November, 1966, uses the terminology "land motor vehicle," not "automobile," in this
exclusion. State Farm Mutual Automobile Policy 9536.6 (Illinois), issued for the policy
period commencing November 4, 1966. No doubt this change is purely coincidental.
59 See Kirkland, Recent Developments in Uninsured Motorists Coverage, 1964 NEGLIGENCE
L.F. 33.
60 Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 455, 117 S.E.2d 867 (1961). See also 79 A.L.R.2d
1252, 1255 (1961).
61 70 Ill. App. 2d 357, 217 N.E.2d 814 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1036 (1967).
This policy contained an optional, not mandatory, arbitration provision; neither party
demanded arbitration.
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uninsured motorist coverage. The insurer contended that it was not liable
because, inter alia, it had not given its written consent to prosecute to judgment.
The court, however, was not impressed with this contention and entered judg-
ment in favor of the insured for the full $60,000. In the course of its opinion,
the appellate court referred to an earlier Illinois case and quoted from that
opinion as follows:
There was an implied promise on the part of the Insurance Company
that it would not unreasonably or arbitrarily withhold its written consent.
The company gave no reason for its refusal to allow the plaintiffs to obtain
a judgment against the uninsured motorist. . . . Under these circumstances,
the action of the company in arbitrarily withholding its written consent
constitutes a violation of the implied provisions of the policy and conse-
quently the exclusion clause is not a bar to this action. 2 (Emphasis added.)
The court in Andeen concluded with this language:
Defendant insurance company was kept fully advised throughout the pro-
ceedings before us. It received written notice of the filing of the complaint
and also specific written notice of the time for the hearing . . . . The
company had every opportunity to defend the suit if it desired to do so
or to demand arbitration .... The company did nothing. It did not ask
for arbitration nor did it defend the suit against the uninsured motorist.
It cannot take advantage of its own failure to act in order to avoid liability
under the contract of insurance.
63
Such reasoning may also be applicable in a situation where a carrier unreasonably
withholds its consent to a settlement.
IV. Conditions
A. Proof of Claim; Medical Reports
The endorsement provides that, "as soon as practicable," the insured or
other person making claim furnish a written proof of claim containing full
particulars of the nature and extent of injuries and treatment. Examinations
or statements made under oath are required, as is submission to physical ex-
aminations as often as reasonably required by the company..
B. Notice of Legal Action
The insured or his representative must forward to the company copies of
the summons and complaint immediately upon initiation of any suit against
the alleged tortfeasor. This requirement is not excused by the company's actual
knowledge of such litigation,64 and a judgment obtained without satisfying this
condition is ordinarily void."5 However, in at least one instance, a carrier has
62 Id. at 363, 217 N.E.2d at 817, quoting from Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 31
Ill. App. 2d 157, 164, 175 N.E.2d 607, 611 (1961).
63 Id. at 366, 217 N.E.2d at 818.
64 Creteau v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 202 Va. 641, 119 S.E.2d 336 (1961). See Matthews
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Va. 1961).
65 See Creteau v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 202 Va. 641, 119 S.E.2d 336 (1961).
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been held to have waived this requirement when it requested medical reports
and conducted a physical examination without objecting to the noncompliance."
C. Limits of Liability
Under the standard endorsement, the liability of the carrier is expressly
limited to those amounts specified as minimum in the financial responsibility
statute of the respective state. This total amount will be reduced by: (1) any
payment made under the bodily injury coverage in the same accident; (2) any
payment made under the medical payment clause; and (3) any amount paid
or payable to the insured under the workmen's compensation or disability
benefits law. The operation of this reduction, or set-off, provision may be
illustrated by this example: Assume A is a passenger in B's automobile which
is covered up to $10,000-$20,000 limits when it is involved in an accident
with an uninsured automobile owned and driven by C. Assume also that both
B and C are negligent. A would have claims against both drivers under the
single policy of B. His claim against B would arise under the bodily injury
coverage, and his claim against C could be pursued under the uninsured motorist
clause in an action against B's insurer. In any event, though, his total recovery
is limited to $10,000.67
The set-off regarding medical expense payments operates in the following
manner: an insured who sustains total damages of $3,500, of which $1,000
represents medical bills, would recover $1,000 under the medical pay coverage
and $2,500 under the uninsured motorist clause. On the other hand, there
would be no set-off if the total damages exceed the policy limits applicable to
such damages. Thus, if the insured sustains total damages of $11,500, of which
$1,000 represents medical bills, the $1,000 is recoverable under the medical
payment coverage, and the full $10,000 limit is recoverable under the unin-
sured motorist clause. The total recovery would therefore be $11,000- the
entire combined limits under both coverages of the policy.
The provision calling for reduction of the amount otherwise payable to
the extent of any workmen's compensation benefits received by the insured has
been held invalid in some states."8 The theory applied by the courts of these
states is that the premium was paid as consideration for the state-required cover-
age specified in the financial responsibility law, and the right of the insured to
that coverage is contemplated to be over and above any benefits he may receive
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The validity of the provision has been
upheld in other states. 9
A New York court has held that state disability benefits received by the
insured are not to be deducted from his recovery under this provision. 0 That
66 Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wildman, 12 App. Div. 2d 664, 209 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1960).
67 This illustration is patterned after that which appears in Hume, Uninsured Automobile
Insurance Coverage, 48 ILL. B.J. 176, 180 (1959).
68 E.g., Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 189 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1966); Peterson v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 Ore. 106, 393 P.2d 651 (1964).
69 E.g., Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 804, 26 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1962);
Niekamp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 2d 364, 202 N.E.2d 126 (1964).
70 Danielewicz v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 50 Misc. 2d 844, 271
N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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court was impressed with the fact that the employee contributes toward his dis-
ability coverage, whereas no such contribution is made toward the workmen's
compensation program.
D. Other Insurance
As of the 1963 revision, the standard uninsured motorist endorsement
established two basic categories:
(1) with regard to bodily injury to the insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by a named insured, then this insurance applies only
as excess over any other similar insurance available to such insured occu-
pant, and applies then only in the amount by which its limits exceed the
total combined limits of all such other insurance [which usually means no
application at all];
(2) in all other cases where the insured has other uninsured motorist
coverage available to him [as where he owns two cars, each with this cover-
age effective, but is injured as a pedestrian or an occupant in an uninsured
automobile] his two or more policies would prorate up to the higher of the
applicable limits.
72
This provision initially was given a literal, strict interpretation by the courts,
often with predictably harsh results. An excellent example is the case of Travelers
Indemnity Company v. Wells.7 ' A federal court there held that the insured
passenger's own policy ($30,000) was inapplicable even though the entire $30,-
000 limits of his driver's policy had been exhausted inpaying prior judgments
obtained by the driver himself for his injuries and for the death of his son. This
was a situation in which both policies had identical limits and, therefore, the
second policy did not apply. Such situations, in view of results such as this,
obviously induce races to the courthouse.3
The Wells case has been expressly disapproved in subsequent cases, the first
of which was Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company."'
In this case, the plaintiff was driving a truck owned by his father when he was
struck and injured by an uninsured vehicle. After securing a judgment of $85,000
against the uninsured motorist, he then sought to collect the limits under both his
father's policy and his own policy (the limits were identical). The court held
71 In considering these categories, it should be noted that in most situations there will
be no difference between the specific limits of one policy applicable to a given situation and
a second such policy. The explanation for this is that most companies write their uninsured
motorist coverages for the minimum limits required by the particular state financial respon-
sibility law ($10,000-$20,000 in most states). This is not generally a legal necessity,
however. In most, if not all, states the intention of the legislature was to establish minimum
limits for this type of protection-not maximum limits. One Illinois decision. Deterding v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 29, 222 N.E.2d 523 (1966), held this
to be the intent of the Illinois legislature. This case was followed the next year by the
enactment of an amendment to the Insurance Code which expressly' stated that "nothing
in this Section shall be construed to prevent any insurer from extending coverage under terms
and conditions more favorable to its insureds than is required hereunder." ILL. Rav. STAT.
ch. 73, § 755a(2) (1965), as amended, July 1, 1967.
72 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963).
73 Such a "race" apparently was never staged in the Wells case, though, because all
occupants of the car were represented by the same counsel.
74 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
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that the amount of the recovery under both policies was to be measured by the
amount of the insured's judgment limited by the aggregate limits of coverage
under both policies. The "other insurance" clause was held invalid by reason
of the provisions of the Virginia uninsured motorist statute.
Shortly after the Bryant case was decided by the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, the federal district court was faced once again with a similar dispute.
The court indicated that it would have allowed the plaintiff to recover the full
amount of his judgment limited by the aggregate limits of both policies if the
uninsured motorist provisions had been applicable to the case. In the course
of its opinion, the court cited the Bryant case and accepted its holding."5 Similarly,
this "pyramiding" of coverages was approved in a 1966 Florida case, Sellers v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company.' The court stated that an insured
under two or more policies "can proceed against any one or more of them, but
in any event he shall not be entitled to recover from all of them more than the
amount of his loss . . .,,"
Consequently, on this question of "other insurance," it seems that the
courts are now adopting a more realistic approach with regard to the problem
of "other insurance." This change in attitude is premised primarily on two
propositions: (a) the coverage afforded by the first policy, when exhausted, is
not actually other "available" insurance and therefore the second policy is
applicable; (b) the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to provide com-
pensation for innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists, and to hold
otherwise would defeat that purpose.
E. Arbitration
The standard policy, as revised in January, 1963, provides as follows:
[ . . F]or the purpose of this coverage, determination as to whether
the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such dam-
ages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between
the insured or such representative and the company or, if they fail to agree,
by arbitration.
This arbitration clause is easily the most controversial provision in the entire
endorsement. It has been estimated that it is definitely valid and enforceable
in only twenty-three states"' and the District of Columbia, probably void in
seven states,"9 and in the remaining twenty states "it would be purely a guess."8
Generally, the reason assigned for considering it void is that it would act to oust
75 Pulley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va. 1965).
76 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966).
77 Id. at 692.
78 Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
For statutory and case citations, see Hume, The Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 12 FEDERATION
OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 7, 9 (1962).
79 Id. at 10. These states are Idaho, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.
80 Id.
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the courts of jurisdiction to determine future disputes. In any event, the provision
is not binding on minors and they cannot be required to arbitrate.8
When the arbitration clause first appeared in the endorsement, it was
optional and could be invoked only if the insured so desired. Subsequently the
clause was altered to make arbitration optional to either party and, more recently,
to make it mandatory and the exclusive means of resolving the essential issues
in the event of disagreement. It has been held by one court, however, that if
neither party serves a demand for arbitration - the plaintiff suing for a declara-
tory judgment and the defendant making no motion to stay the action and no
request for arbitration -and both parties move for summary judgment, arbi-
tration is waived by the parties.82
It may well be that an insurance carrier would be much better off without
an arbitration clause in the policy because of the danger of double payment.
The theory behind this statement is that in a court, where the insured files a
complaint and the uninsured motorist files a counterclaim, a jury can find in
favor of only one party. If the company is found liable to the uninsured motorist
under its bodily injury liability coverage, it would not be liable to the insured.
Moreover, it is conceivable that both litigants could be found negligent, in which
case the company would be home free with purse intact.
Add an arbitration clause, though, and the result could be much different.
Assume the uninsured motorist sues the insured, an action which must be de-
fended by the carrier. If that suit collects dust due to a congested trial docket
or from some other reason, the insured may well succeed in recovering an award
against the carrier by arbitration before a judgment can be rendered. That award
would not affect the uninsured motorist's court action since he was not a party
to the arbitration. Thus, the latter individual might ultimately obtain a jury
verdict against the insured. The carrier would then end up paying both parties
and probably wondering what went wrong.83
A source of considerable confusion and uncertainty has been the question
of exactly which issues may be arbitrated. On the surface it seems a bit sur-
prising that there exists any doubt in this regard, for the policy language appears
quite clear and unambiguous: "determination as to whether the insured ... is
legally entitled to recover such damages, and if so the amount thereof... shall
be made by . . . arbitration." (Emphasis added.) Thus, it would seem that
two issues are arbitrable: liability and damages. Unfortunately, there seems to
be disagreement among the various courts on this point - even among different
courts within a given state. For example, the "majority rule" in New York
apparently favors a narrow scope of arbitration. For most New York courts,
this mode of resolution is not open to such questions as whether there was in
fact an "uninsured automobile,"8 4 or whether the plaintiff qualifies as an "in-
81 Chernick v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 264, 187 N.Y.S.2d 534
(1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 756, 168 N.E.2d 110, 201 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1960); Benfante v.
Commercial Ins. Co., 5 Misc. 2d 772, 162 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
82 McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 35,
224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963).
83 This theoretical, if not likely, possibility is posed by Hume, supra note 71, at 11.
84 Rosenbaum v. American Sur. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d
375 (1962); Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Linder, 17 App. Div. 2d
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sured," 5 or whether a "hit-and-run" automobile was involved.8 6 Such matters
have been held to be arbitrable, however, in other cases decided within the same
state.
Some other issues which are generally considered beyond the scope of arbi-
tration in New York, and which therefore must be determined by declaratory
judgment, are: whether timely notice was given, 8 whether the proceeding is
barred by the statute of limitations, 9 whether a valid disclaimer was in fact
made,"0 and whether a report was made to the proper officials. 9 The narrow,
"two-issue" interpretation is similarly applied in Connecticut,9 2 Florida,9" Michi-
gan94 and Ohio. 5 The broader view seems to have been adopted in California 8
and Massachusetts.9 7
Arbitration is initiated by either the insurer or the insured by serving a
"Demand for Arbitration" on the opposite party and sending two copies thereof
to the American Arbitration Association (A.A.A.). This demand briefly de-
scribes the claim and quotes the arbitration provision of the policy9 The party
initiating the proceeding also advances a nonrefundable filing fee of $50. Fees
for second and subsequent hearings - which are quite rare - are $25 for each
party.
99
There has been some uncertainty manifested on the question of which
statute of limitations applies in considering the timeliness of the arbitration
demand. The insurance coverage arises out of contract, but a recovery depends
upon proof of legal liability, which involves proof of negligence on the part of
the uninsured motorist, proximate cause, and so forth. Application of the con-
tracts limitations period would be most favorable to the insured, since it is at
least several years longer than the torts limitations period in nearly all states.
610, 230 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1962); Application of Phoenix Assur. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 998,
194 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1959); Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Kreskowski,
35 Misc. 2d 973, 231 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Mitkewicz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22
Misc. 2d 637, 198 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ; In re Allstate Ins. Co., 26 Misc. 2d 859, 207
N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
85 McGuiness v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 32 Misc. 2d 949, 225
N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
86 Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Comerchero, 34 Misc. 2d 52, 227
N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 33
Misc. 2d 455, 227 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnifica-
tion Corp., 227 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
87 In re Zurich Ins. Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 669, 219 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
Royal Indem. Co. v. McMahon, 10 App. Div. 2d 926, 200 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
88 In re Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Misc. 2d 782, 241 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
In re Di Stefano, 235 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1962).
89 In re Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Misc. 2d 782, 241 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
90 Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Lucash, 16 App. Div. 2d 975, 230
N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
91 In re Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 227 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
92 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 25 Conn. Sup. 414, 206 A.2d
847 (1964).
93 American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 174 So. 2d 106 (Fla. App. 1965); Zeagler
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 616 (Fla. App. 1964).
94 Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Strange, 3 Mich. App. 733, 143 N.W.2d 572 (1966).
95 Murtaugh v. American States Ins. Co., 25 Ohio Op. 2d 106, 187 N.E.2d 518 (1963).
But see McKinney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Ohio App. 2d 136, 216 N.E.2d 887 (1966).
96 Jordan v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 127, 42 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1965).
97 Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Garney, 348 Mass. 627, 205 N.E.2d 8 (1965).
98 AMERICAN ARBITRATION Ass'N, AcCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL RULES § 7.
99 Id. at § 37.
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The principal argument advanced in favor of the shorter torts period -is
that any further delay will impair or destroy the company's subrogation rights
against the uninsured motorist. This argument tends to overlook the fact that
the company could prevent the statute from running on these subrogation rights
merely by requesting the insured to file suit against the uninsured motorist prior
to arbitration. He would be obligated to comply with such a request by reason
of the co-operation clause of the policy. Ignoring this element of control avail-
able to the carrier, a second argument is that by allowing the period to lapse the
insured has lost his claim against the uninsured motorist and thus is not "legally
entitled to recover" from him; therefore, the policy coverage is not applicable.
The technically correct answer would be that the right (legal entitlement) is
still there; only the remedy is lost. Concededly, there is some truth to the counter-
argument here that a right without a remedy is a little bit like a camera without
film or a comb without teeth- it is of rather limited utility. However, in this
instance the insured still has a remedy against his insurer. In any event, it now
appears well established that it is the contracts statute of limitations that is to
apply.
After the arbitration demand has been filed, the opposing party may file
an answer in duplicate with the A.A.A. within seven days. If no answer is
filed the claim will be taken as denied."' The arbitrator (usually one, but some
policies now call for three) is then appointed from a special panel consisting
of attorneys who have been nominated by bar associations around the country
or from other attorneys who are arbitrators. The arbitrator serves without pay." 2
Either party may advise the A.A.A. of any reason why he believes the arbitrator
appointed should not serve; following consideration of such complaint, the
A.A.A. may appoint a substitute.
Five days' notice is given to the parties prior to hearings. Any party is
entitled to be represented by counsel' and nearly every party is so represented.
The hearings are informal but orderly. The complaining party ordinarily pre-
sents his evidence first, although this procedure may be reversed by the arbitrator.
The burden of proof does not rest on one party more than the other; each party
must attempt to convince the arbitrator."' Direct communication between the
parties and the arbitrator, other than at the formal hearings, is prohibited." 5
Any award must be rendered by the arbitrator within thirty days after the hear-
ings are closed.' If the parties happen to settle their differences during the
arbitration, the arbitrator may, upon their request, set forth the terms of the
agreed settlement in an award.'
One writer has expounded the belief that "the -very fact that arbitration
is aimed at an 'award' rather than a 'verdict' indicates the unlikelihood of any
100 La Marsh v. Maryland Gas. Co., 35 Misc. 2d 641, 231 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
In re Travelers Indem. Co., 226 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Cecarilli v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 204 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
101 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL RULES § 7.
102 Id. at § 11.
103 Id. at § 15.
104 Id.
105 Id. at § 31.
106 Id. at § 32.
107 Id. at § 35.
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rejection of the claim in its entirety."'0 8 It does seem as though the word "award"
connotes an affirmative. However, this is little more than a matter of semantics,
inasmuch as one dictionary definition of the word is "a judgment or final de-
cision; ... the decision of arbitrators in a case submitted to them .... ""'
Experience has shown that the vast majority of the arbitration proceedings
have resulted in decisions in favor of the insured."' With respect to the amount
of those awards, a 1960 poll of the leading insurance companies revealed that
over 90 percent felt the amounts were roughly equivalent to verdicts customarily
returned by juries."'
The standard arbitration clause recites that "such person and the company
each agree to consider itself bound and to be bound by any award . . . ." In
some of the newer policies, requiring three arbitrators, it is provided that the
written decision of any two of them shall be binding. The finality of the awards
is evident from a reading of some of the reported cases. In one, the court refused
to disturb an award granting the exact amount of the special damages incurred
(i.e., funeral, burial and incidental expenses), while allowing nothing for the
wrongful death." 2 In another, the court held that an award may not bd
impeached for any error of law or fact and affirmed an award of $2,000 for the
death of a 42-year-old insured who had been in the peak of health, earned
$13,000 a year and contributed to the support of a sister and an invalid mother
with whom he lived."
A tremendous upward trend in the use of the arbitration clause of the
endorsement is reflected in the figures below. These figures represent the number








The number of arbitration claims filed during the first two months of 1966 was
20 percent greater than the number filed during the same period in 1965."'
F. Trust Agreement
The endorsement also contains a trust agreement between the insured and
the carrier, which comes into effect upon payment by the latter to any person
under the endorsement. By the trust agreement, co-operation is promised by the
insured in any suit filed in the insured's name. The agreement states that "in the
108 Hapner, A Dozen Problems in Arbitration of Uninsured Motorist Claims Under Amer-
ican Arbitration Association Rules, 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 92, 96 (1967).
109 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1965).
110 See King, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Claims, 14 U. FLA. L.REv. 328 (1962).
111 Hume, The Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 12 FEDERATION OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 7,
10-11 (1962).
112 Wainwright v. Globe Indem. Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 971, 221 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1961).
113 Phillips v. American Cas. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 873, 175 N.E.2d 825, 216 N.Y.S.2d 694
(1961).
114 Christensen, Uninsured Motorist Arbitration, 1966 INSURANCE ADJUSTER 41-42.
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event of recovery, the company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery for
expenses, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by it in connection therewith." This
subrogation action may be brought not only against the, uninsured or other
vehicle operator, but against "any person or organization." This includes owners
and operators of taverns involved in a dramshop suit. '
V. Conclusion
Ten years have now elapsed since New Hampshire initiated the manda-
tory use of this new breed of insurance known as "uninsured motorist coverage."
Concededly, the endorsement is no panacea. It is still the subject of much
controversy, and perhaps even more bewilderment and confusion. The path
to a just award under this coverage is lined with pitfalls, ruts and hazardous
curves in the form of conditions, exclusions and restrictive definitions. Such is
true, however, of the path to recovery under most types of insurance. Whatever
the criticism, this experiment is registering a high degree of success in achieving
its objective- to alleviate many of the woes heretofore borne by the innocent
victims of financially irresponsible motorists. It seems to be here to stay.
115 Remsen v. Midway Liquors, 30 IIl. App. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961).
